Introduction
In the postmodern age, the conventional multilateral and/or bilateral understanding of diplomacy has been challenged. Therefore, diplomacy and foreign policy are in the midst of the continuous process of change and adaptation to new political, economic, technological, and security realities. In particular, technological developments, digital media, social media, and the public sphere became central in shaping diplomacy and foreign policy. Digital media and social media, as new instruments, in turn, influence and shape the image of a particular country in the global public sphere. In this regard, both state and non-state diplomatic actors have to adapt to new postmodern realities. They require a thorough understanding of multiple perspectives of the issues and interests within the postmodern and digital contexts. Thus, diplomacy offers win-win opportunities in tackling sensitive issues and challenges. Although in the course of diplomatic communication, it is important to maintain good foreign office-to-foreign office relations between two nation-states it is also significant to (re)consider the public sphere, digital technologies and cosmopolitan framework. The postmodern age is characterized by fragmentation, uncertainty, liquidity, individualization, plurality, and diversity, which in turn led to fragmentation and diversity of our perceptions, wants, needs, interests, experiences and ideological orientations. Therefore, diplomacy has to engage the postmodern age and respond to diverse actors that coexist and act in the public sphere. Using of digital technologies in diplomacy has accelerated due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which has been extended to continuous diplomatic engagement and presence in the public sphere. Finally, the cosmopolitan framework, which is the subject of this paper, has extended the diplomatic scope that is significantly attuned to the world risk society and reflexive modernization.
This paper frames Türkiye’s cosmopolitan relations with the Western Balkans on Ulrich Beck’s conceptions of risk, reflexivity, and cosmopolitan vision. The world of metamorphosis (verwandlung), grounded on digital and network technologies, certainly require new diplomatic approaches, techniques, and methods. The postmodern world and world risk society emerged as a result of science and technology, climatic and environmental changes, security threats, digitalization, and artificial intelligence. Such metamorphosis (verwandlung) requires a cosmopolitan reflexive reaction and cosmopolitan diplomatic approach, which strongly considers the interconnected world, global risks, and transnational forms. On the contrary, since the creation of modern nation-states, the Western Balkans relations have been strongly based on ethnonational, nation-state, and ideological models, which inhibit democratization, economic development, and regional security. The Western Balkans countries function within the nation-state container and focus on history, conflicts, borders, and ethnic exclusiveness, without tackling the global, transnational, and shared risks and opportunities. This is the reason why the Balkan’s savage, divisive, disintegrative, and backward image has prevailed.
Technological developments, digital media, social media and the public sphere became central in shaping diplomacy and foreign policy
Turkish foreign policy and diplomacy towards the Western Balkans has evolved through different phases, which included the focus on conflict resolution, peace, humanitarian assistance, state-building, security, and economic and trade relations. In the past few decades Türkiye’s foreign policy and diplomacy, strongly based on soft power and pragmatism, has been characterized by the use of different approaches and instruments. Furthermore, Turkish foreign policy was conditioned by regional ethnic-nationalist programs and ideologies that emphasize ethnicity, nationality, borders, religion, history, and culture. Therefore, this paper attempts to explore Beck’s theories and concepts in framing Türkiye’s cosmopolitan diplomacy towards the Western Balkans. What could be the role of involuntary enlightenment, enforced communication across different borders, political catharsis, enforced cosmopolitanism, global system of governance, international legalism, and digitalization in framing Türkiye’s cosmopolitan diplomacy towards the Western Balkans? How the focus on environmental diplomacy, health diplomacy, migration diplomacy, reconciliation diplomacy, digital diplomacy, youth diplomacy, and education diplomacy could encounter an exclusive Western Balkans focus on emancipatory politics, ethnonationalism, narratives, and ideologies?
Cosmopolitanism
A doctrine of progress, as the essence of modernity, has been used for the study of an ever-changing world, whereby the notion of change and scientific progress were seen as vehicles of human continuous progress and development. Such linear progress and development were strongly rooted in the philosophy and sociology of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831), and Auguste Comte (1798-1857).1 Thus, linear knowledge strongly grounded in science, technology, and research, contributed to human progressive development, represented in the mechanical worldview, mass production, the electronic age, information technology, and scientific knowledge. Consequently, the modern world was seen as progressive, structural, orderly, and predictable. These developments inevitably led to the emergence of digital technology and network society, which began to shape the postmodern world of risk and uncertainty.2 Therefore, Ulrich Beck began to question the doctrine of progress because the world is not simply changing and progressing but we live in a world of metamorphosis (verwandlung), which requires new ways of coping with risks and a shift from methodological nationalism to methodological cosmopolitanism.3
The Western Balkans political framework, relations, and current political issues should be viewed within postcommunist and post-conflict contexts, whereby the region’s democratic and economic transition has been conditioned by these two challenges
The modern structural world, grounded on science and technology, consequently led to the postmodern world and world risk society.4 By the mid-1980s nuclear weapons, nuclear catastrophes, nuclear radiation, warfare, new military destructive technologies, environmental hazards, and over-use of energy had provoked the debates on the cosmopolitan vision and global risk society. A common view prevailed that manufactured uncertainty and world risk society will define the 21st century.5 First, the subordination of nature to science and technology caused serious environmental and climatic changes due to hazardous emissions, ultraviolet radiation, frequent flooding, snowmelt, hurricanes, and earthquakes. Thus, the postmodern world entered the Anthropocene Age, whereby nature is no longer nature due to the human invasion of the planet. These postmodern challenges transcend specific geographies, state institutions, and nation-state borders.6 Second, the postmodern world has encountered biological, biomedical, and chemical threats, which reached their climax in the COVID-19 pandemic. These threats require global awareness, collaboration, and coordinated actions, which greatly define global security.7 Third, terrorism, migrations, and securitization contributed to the emergence of the state/world of exemption and the state/world obsession with risk prevention and its management.8 Fourth, uncertainties and risks have been caused so far by the rise of the global population and demographic aging, which challenge the global sustenance and functioning of the global system of governance.9 Fifth, the postmodern world is shaped by artificial intelligence, whereby smart robots, cars, phones, and computers shape and transform human automated lives and created a metamorphosis generation. Then, modern technology contributed to the emergence of automated authority, governance, planning, and decision-making. This in turn affected the conventional understanding of the system of governance and security.10
The above-mentioned examples clearly envision the postmodern world, which is metamorphosing and requires a reflexive reaction.11 In this regard, the global risks are beyond the nation-state model and require a new cosmopolitan reflexive approach. Beck challenged modern concepts, methods, and views based on the notions of non-knowledge, metamorphosis, and emancipatory catastrophism. He held an ironic view that humanity must cope with insecurities, whereby there is a need for a shift from a linear world seen as progressive, orderly, systematic, and structural.12 The postmodern world is framed by security issues, existential threats, and manufactured uncertainties. Since 9/11 the securitization and manufactured uncertainties have become a condition of the global world. Since risks take place at spatial, temporal, and social levels, risks and uncertainties evolve beyond nation-state borders, with unlimited and unpredictable effects and consequences. Thus, in the future states, state institutions, state authorities, and experts will encounter difficulties in their rigid attempts of controlling risks.13 Therefore, the postmodern world challenges the effectiveness of the nation-state model in tackling global governance and security, including pandemic threats, natural disasters, and climatic changes.14
Ulrich Beck has reaffirmed the significance of cosmopolitanism and risk society discourse in the postmodern world. Cosmopolitan vision is a sociological phenomenon and as such has some similarities with internationalism, globalization, transnationalism, universalism, and the like. First, cosmopolitan vision takes into consideration independent and lived realities, cultures, diverse expectations, and experiences within unconscious and unintended contexts, spaces, and times. Therefore, cosmopolitized reality leads to the borderless necessity to cooperate and solve global problems and exchange with others. Second, cosmopolitanism as a new social determinant strongly takes into consideration a global and interconnected world and transnational forms of social and political organization.15 Third, a cosmopolitan vision requires a departure from methodological nationalism and its limited national outlooks to methodological cosmopolitanism and the interconnectedness of the world. Methodological nationalism as an old paradigm uses an uncritical focus on nation-state models, including sovereignty, governance, security, and citizenship.16 Fourth, in the postmodern world, society and politics exist outside the nation-state models due to digital communications and media. These trends also contributed to individualization and the emergence of new psycho-social norms and values. Extreme and unpredictable individual lifestyles replaced old class patterns. Thus, the postmodern world is inevitably based on subjective perceptions, emotions, and feelings, which in turn produce risks and uncertainties. Individuals are detached from state structures and they question the so-called systematic and orderly way of life. All this contributed towards a change of national, ethnic, and religious identities, especially at the local and national levels.17
The Western Balkans does not use the cosmopolitan models to respond collectively to global and transnational risks
The future of the postmodern world could be dark, but high risks may produce high opportunities too. Therefore, Beck’s cosmopolitan vision as the third way makes the focus on international legalism, international civil society, international elites, transnational networks, transnational corporations, global governance, global security, global citizenship, global cooperation, and activism.18 This paper aims to use some of these cosmopolitan models to propose Türkiye’s cosmopolitan relations with the Western Balkans.
The Dilemma of the Western Balkans Relations
The Western Balkans political framework, relations, and current political issues should be viewed within post-communist and post-conflict contexts, whereby the region’s democratic and economic transition has been conditioned by these two challenges. In addition, from the post-Ottoman period to the breakup of former Yugoslavia, the Western Balkans states have been in the continuous process of nation-state building and a challenge to accommodate minorities. In the 1990s attempts at the creation of homogeneous, mono-ethnic, and mono-national states, based on old nation-state models, resulted in conflicts and further inhibited bilateral relations, which in turn slowed down the democratic and economic progress of the region.19 Consequently, the Western Balkans countries are semi-consolidated, transitional, and/or hybrid democracies. The region has been in a ‘permanent transition’ without strong security, political, economic, and social certainty.20
Minor transitions and reforms in the Western Balkans have been achieved due to the Euro-Atlantic integration process. The process of stabilization, association, candidacy, and integration processes have partially contributed to democratic and market reforms and harmonization of legislation and governance with the EU.21 The EU agenda has been especially aimed at political stability, security, and crisis management because of fears from the revival of old Western Balkans hatred and conflicts.22 Therefore, in the past two decades, the Euro-Atlantic policy framework and the Western Balkans regional cooperation platforms contributed to the partial improvement of bilateral, diplomatic, and trade relations. However, the ‘permanent transition,’ ‘security crisis,’ ‘state-capture,’ and ‘corruption’ significantly inhibit the democratization process and market economy development.23
Bosnia and Herzegovina has very complex relations with neighboring countries because of external and internal factors. For instance, the local ethnic-nationalist political leaders pursue parallel diplomatic relations with Serbia and Croatia, which further destabilize relations at the state level. This is coupled with the entity of Serb Republic that pursues sub-national or quasi-diplomatic activities. Although the foreign policy pillars include security, stability, economic prosperity, protection, international cooperation, and the promotion of BiH, the effectiveness of the Presidency’s foreign policy has been questioned.24 Due to a complex inter-ethnic structure, Bosnia and Herzegovina strongly supports regional peace, stability, and cooperation. However, interference from Belgrade and Zagreb significantly undermines the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina and this meddling in Bosnian affairs has been supported by parallel political and diplomatic structures within the country. The leaders and top-ranking officials from Croatia and Serbia tour Bosnian ethnic territories and neglect the state and governmental institutions. In the last few years, the leaders from Serbia and Croatia developed an idea that three separate nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina are represented by their ethnic-national leaders, which is the main reason why they neglect the state and governmental institutions. The leaders from Serbia began calling for the creation of the “Serb World” which is viewed as direct support for the secession of Republika Srpska (RS) from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnia and Herzegovina has a number of bilateral disputes with Croatia such as the building of the Pelješac Bridge, border disputes, succession issues, and nuclear waste disposal on the border with BiH. Similarly, bilateral disputes with Serbia are due to territorial pretensions, genocide, war crimes, diplomatic parallelism and unresolved demarcation line and borders.25
With the end of the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, Turkish foreign policy made a shift from conflict resolution and humanitarian assistance to peace-building and state-building processes
Strained Western Balkans relations are also due to strong Russian influence in the region, which is especially felt in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia has skillfully used Serbia and the entity RS as proxies to challenge the Euro-Atlantic integration process and security. Russia has exploited regional political issues, ethnic divisions, and minorities to back pro-Russian political factions, especially in Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. For instance, Russia contributed to the militarization of police in RS, supported the referendum, the Serb objections to the Court verdicts, revisionism of the Srebrenica Genocide, non-compliance on the NATO path, blocking of the state institutions and non-cooperation and non-recognition of the newly appointed High Representative. Russian influence is exercised through the financial, energy, military, and economic sectors.26 Due to this influence, Serbia and RS policies inhibit the regional Euro-Atlantic integration process. For instance, on December 23, 2022, Maria Zaharova, Spokeswoman of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, criticized the granting to Bosnia and Herzegovina of EU candidate status, viewing it as Western pressure on the Balkans countries. Similarly, Bojan Kharcenko, Russia’s Ambassador to Serbia argued that Bosnian candidacy status is dangerous because of the possibility of additional pressure on Republika Srpska.27 Furthermore, the regional frustration with the EU strategy, conditionality, and blocking, as in the case of the Bulgarian blocking of North Macedonia, led to the creation of a vacuum for other powers like Russia and China in the Western Balkans.
Montenegro also struggles with identity and ethnic politics due to its heterogeneous population and ethnic-based cleavages. For a long time, Serbia and the pro-Serbian politics of the Serb minority in Montenegro have destabilized this country. Pro-Serbian political parties closely cooperate with Belgrade and they have provoked discussions about the national identity, language, religion, and Montenegro-Serbian relations. For instance, the pro-Serbian Democratic Front-led coalition conducted radical and violent campaigns against NATO integration. Thus, Serbia-Montenegro relations further deteriorated due to Montenegro’s membership in NATO and the adoption of the Law on Freedom of Religion and Church Property.28
Serbia-Kosovo relations were strained even before the 1988-1999 conflict but they culminated when Kosovo unilaterally declared independence from Serbia. On February 17, 2008, the Assembly of Kosovo adopted the Declaration of Independence.29 On April 19, 2013, Kosovo and Serbia signed the Brussels Agreement, which granted an integration of autonomous Serb-majority municipalities into the Kosovo legal system. The agreement paved the way for ending parallel legal and institutional structures.30 Although more than 100 countries recognized Kosovo’s independence, Serbia refuses mutual recognition, which has been one of the key points of dispute. Serbia views Kosovo as its national and religious cradle, and this is still enshrined in its constitution. Since its independence, numerous disputes have emerged such as punitive tariffs, the position of Kosovo’s Serbs and their municipalities, territorial disputes over the Trepča industrial-mining complex and Gazivode artificial lake, Kosovo’s army, and registration plates.
Animosities between Western Balkans countries have historical roots in the wars of the 1990s. For instance, Montenegro-Croatia animosities were due to the shelling of Dubrovnik, Serbia-Bosnia, and Herzegovina relations are burdened with war crimes and genocide. The Serbia-Kosovo dispute has deep roots in the conflict and unresolved mutual recognition. All these countries have problems with the demarcation of the borders and the position of national minorities. In the case of North Macedonia, it had a two-decade-long bilateral dispute with Greece regarding the name, which also prevented NATO membership. However, in 2018 Alexis Tsipras and Zoran Zaev reached the Prespa Agreement, which in effect led to North Macedonia NATO membership. However, North Macedonian EU accession is being blocked again by Bulgaria over the issue of language and historical grievances.31
The Western Balkans does not use the cosmopolitan models to respond collectively to global and transnational risks. In addition, an absence of the cosmopolitan vision inhibits democratic capacities, socio-economic development, security and regional cooperation. That is why current platforms for cooperation could not produce desirable results because of an exclusive focus on the classical nation-state models. Therefore, the Western Balkans countries must modify the old nation-state models with emerging cosmopolitan models. The basic analysis would indicate parallel security, economic, socio-political, financial, energy, tourism, scientific, and technological structures that have not been harmonized within the region. In view of this discussion, the Western Balkans countries should assess their old nation-state models with emerging postmodern cosmopolitan models.
Türkiye’s Foreign Policy towards the Western Balkans
Türkiye has always been a decisive political actor in the Balkans, because of the past historical legacy and strong kinship relations. From a geopolitical perspective, the Balkans is a bridge between Türkiye and Europe, whereby any regional transitions may have a direct impact on Türkiye. In the past two decades, Turkish foreign policy towards the Balkans has been significantly researched and the main approaches, determinants, tools, and phases have been clearly explained.32 Thus, this paper provides an overview of the historical development of the Turkish foreign policy towards the Balkans to introduce the readers to cosmopolitan policies and diplomacy.
Türkiye’s medical aid packages were sent to North Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo to support the fight against COVID-19 pandemic. ALİ BALIKÇI / AA
Since 2002 Türkiye’s involvement in the Balkans has changed due to new majority rule by the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Türkiye departed from decades-long Republican isolationism and began promoting political, economic, and cultural interests by using a more dynamic and proactive foreign policy. With the end of the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, Turkish foreign policy made a shift from conflict resolution and humanitarian assistance to peace-building and state-building processes. In this regard, from 2002 to 2008, Türkiye aimed at strengthening the Euro-Atlantic process in the Balkans. Ankara began to harmonize its foreign policy with the Euro-Atlantic strategy and approaches, which were primarily aimed at peace, stability, and security. Such pro-Western Turkish foreign policy was positively evaluated in the European Commission Reports. Therefore, during this period, peace, stability, security, and good neighborly relations were at the core of Turkish foreign policy.33
The second period of Turkish foreign policy (2009-2014) was driven by internal economic growth and development, which in turn affected greater emphasis on the economic, trade, and cultural dimensions of foreign policy. Türkiye also skillfully used the global financial crisis and embarked on the Western Balkans diplomatic campaigns, which culminated in the organization of a number of bilateral and trilateral summits. Besides a strong diplomatic and economic presence, Türkiye’s greater visibility in the region was also represented by cultural and educational non-governmental actors.34
During the third phase (2014 to present), Turkish foreign policy has been primarily conditioned by security concerns because of the failed coup of July 15, 2016, and the number of regional conflicts and crises. Therefore, besides the emphasis on economic cooperation, neighborly relations, support for the Euro-
Atlantic integration process, and soft diplomacy, Turkish foreign policy had to focus on security.35 In this new global security context, Türkiye began treating pragmatically the security threats in Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.36
Türkiye attempts to use effective environmental diplomacy towards the Western Balkans to enhance cooperation on the common green agenda that would explore effective solutions to environmental and climatic change issues
The above overview of Türkiye’s foreign policy towards the Western Balkans is purposefully presented to demonstrate different approaches and use of foreign policy instruments, which have been driven so far by domestic and international factors. Therefore, these factors and foreign policy shifts have significantly affected Turkish engagement and activism in the Western Balkans. In addition, Turkish foreign policy in the Western Balkans was shaped by soft power determinants. However, this paper argues for cosmopolitan foreign policy towards the Western Balkans and postmodern, cosmopolitan, and transnational determinants.
Framing of Türkiye’s cosmopolitan diplomacy should be viewed within the former discussion on Beck’s world risk society, cosmopolitan nationalism, cosmopolitanism, and reflexive modernization. In a nutshell, the postmodern world and world risk society must encounter environmental and climatic changes, biological, biomedical, and chemical threats, security of the digital world, risk and crisis management, demographic risks, technology risks, and the emergence of automated lives, authority, governance, and a metamorphosis generation. It is important to integrate these challenges in cosmopolitan foreign policy and diplomacy.
Türkiye has set a good example as to how foreign policy models towards the Western Balkans could be harmonized with the postmodern cosmopolitan models and instruments. Since the new world order is also strongly grounded on cosmopolitan models, Türkiye has taken into consideration world risk society. According to Beck involuntary enlightenment, represented by the common risks and threats, inevitably cause the world to engage in discourse and collective action.37 In this regard, the environmental problems and catastrophes could lead to the development of regional interdependent consciousness, whereby small and isolated nations cannot cope alone with emerging risks and threats. In compliance with environmental diplomacy expectations, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) and Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) have provided recently numerous search and rescue training in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which in turn have strengthened Turkish cosmopolitan policies and diplomacy in the Western Balkans. AFAD has provided capacity-building programs and actively participated in the most recent earthquake rescue missions in Albania and Croatia.38 Therefore, some political analysts assert that “Türkiye is conducting a ‘humanitarian foreign policy’ in which a group of governmental bodies such as TİKA, AFAD, Kızılay, YTB and THY, collaborate and coordinate with civilian entities, firms, foundations, and NGOs.”39 The Western Balkans countries have been frequently affected by floods, snowdrifts, wildfires, landslides, earthquakes, and droughts. Since all these environmental challenges and problems do not recognize ethnicity, ideology, nation, and specific geography, the Western Balkans countries have a space for dialogue, cooperation, and coordinated action. In this regard, Türkiye attempts to use effective environmental diplomacy towards the Western Balkans to enhance cooperation on the common green agenda that would explore effective solutions to environmental and climatic change issues. Indeed, the green and environmental agenda would integrate the Western Balkans in a dialogue on the environment and climate beyond emancipatory politics, ethnonationalism, narratives, and ideologies.
Turkish cosmopolitan diplomacy would put on the agenda youth, education, science, technology, research and innovations that will prevent the Western Balkans ‘brain drain’ and will contribute to the youth dynamic circulation and networking across the Western Balkans region
Beck argues that the global risks shall enforce communication across different borders, including the borders in the Western Balkans countries.40 Risks and threats compel the people, leaders, and governments to engage in the dialogic democratic discourse, which goes beyond emancipatory politics, narratives, and ideologies.41 Thus, the most concrete example of this was Türkiye’s fostering of a broader Western Balkans dialogue that involves the citizens, private sector, public sector, and the global community. Being a neutral mediator in the Western Balkans, Ankara’s policies are consistent in contributing to the resolution of bilateral disputes. Therefore, Beck’s idea of enforced communication across different borders can serve to understand Türkiye’s proactive peace and conflict resolution policies in the Western Balkans.
The challenge of migrations and the COVID-19 pandemic could become effective platforms for effective dialogic communication across borders. For instance, Turkish COVID-19 proactive diplomacy in the Western Balkans is a good example of how different security and pandemic challenges were used for fostering effective diplomacy. Thus, Türkiye’s cosmopolitan diplomacy towards the Western Balkans has been grounded on health diplomacy, COVID-19 diplomacy, and migration diplomacy, which in turn has strengthened Turkish soft power and capitalization on new economic and geopolitical opportunities. The health ministers of Türkiye, Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, and other Balkans countries undertook an initiative to create the Balkan Medical League, which showed how health diplomacy could strengthen regional cooperation.42 Overall, “Türkiye has instrumentalized the humanitarian and social tools of health diplomacy more than other countries.”43 In fact, health and pandemic risks will in the future elevate regional health diplomacy.
Tragic events, disasters, catastrophes, and suffering often cause political catharsis, which becomes the common language not only among the common people, leaders, and the global community.44 Turkish foreign policy has been grounded on the common tragedies in the Western Balkans that became an opportunity for dialogue and reconciliation, like the 2020 earthquake in Croatia. Similarly, the Western Balkans countries could strengthen their relations by providing a quick disaster response. An excellent example of how disaster diplomacy works is the most recent earthquake in Türkiye, which triggered a response by all Western Balkans countries. Instead of the memory politics and misuse of the commemorations, disaster events could be used for reconciliation and catharsis, making them a part of the common Western Balkans history. Furthermore, Türkiye’s cosmopolitan diplomacy focus on reconciliation and peace diplomacy is already in harmony with the EU framework of regional cooperation and good neighborly relations. For instance, peace diplomacy is in line with the statement of President Erdoğan at the Türkiye-Serbia Business Forum, who said “We see Serbia as a key country for peace and stability in the Balkans. We work in cooperation in order for stability and prosperity to prevail in the region.”45
Beck argued that global risks would eventually lead towards enforced cosmopolitanism because risks do not recognize geographical boundaries.46 Such coordinated efforts are inevitable for the prevention of the spreading of diseases and for the safe mobility of people, goods, and services. Global threats like the destruction of the ecosystem, cyber-attacks, recession, natural disasters, water crisis, governance failure, terrorist attacks, pandemics, inter-state polarization and conflicts, climate change, and others became a good platform for Türkiye’s cosmopolitan diplomacy in engaging the Western Balkans. These challenges require a global response, whereby Türkiye and the Western Balkans can participate more effectively in tackling and managing global risks.
Türkiye exercises soft diplomacy in the Western Balkans through both state and non-state actors. Some of these actors include TİKA, the Yunus Emre Institute (YEE), the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), the Presidency of Religious Affairs (DİB), Red Crescent (Kızılay), Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) and others. Although these actors have been very successful in fostering Turkish soft power in the Western Balkans, youth diplomacy and education diplomacy could further strengthen Turkish cosmopolitan diplomacy, its tools, and its strategies. In this regard, positive examples are Turkish education institutions in the Western Balkans and awarding of the scholarships to young people to continue their education in Türkiye. However, different activities and programs could articulate the importance of young people for the future of the Western Balkans. The creation of such programs and the opening of different youth opportunities could prevent the ‘white plague’ and ‘mass exodus’ of young people and workers from the Western Balkans. Furthermore, such programs could enhance youth education, training, professionalization, entrepreneurship, and youth exchange and network. In this regard, Turkish cosmopolitan diplomacy would put on the agenda youth, education, science, technology, research and innovations that will prevent the Western Balkans ‘brain drain’ and will contribute to the youth dynamic circulation and networking across the Western Balkans region. Furthermore, Türkiye is following several national technological policies under the vision of “National Technological Move” which can help foster the relations between states in terms of technology and would be a win-win situation for all the actors.47
In the postmodern world, the system of governance has been challenged, whereby global risks and governmental wake-up led to the alternative global system of governance and international legalism.48 Since national action is not sufficient, global world interdependence requires global political action and governance. Thanks to the digital world, media, and communication, the old understanding of nation-state borders and sovereignty have already changed. In the postmodern world, transparent and open borders and shared sovereignty prevailed. In this regard, in today’s world the financial system, security system, economic system, and governance operate within a supranational space. According to Brűhl and Rittberger, “global governance is the output of a non-hierarchical network of international and transnational institutions: not only IGOs and international regimes but also transnational regimes are regulating actors’ behavior.”49 The global system of governance and internationalization inevitably brings together different actors to tackle collectively the issues of peace, security, justice, mediation, economics, trade and finance. Thus, the global system of governance is conditioned with risk and risk management, often caused by different humane and technological factors. In this regard, Türkiye and the Western Balkans countries could use the opportunities of the global system of governance to move from being an object of international politics towards being the subject and participatory actor in tackling global risks. To do away with the international tutelage, Türkiye and the Western Balkans countries could initiate and create their own progressive social, political, and economic agenda, attuned with the global prospects.
Climate change, environmental challenges, and security threats will provide a new arena for diplomacy and foreign policy in which postmodern concepts will be articulated, contested, and reconstructed
The digitalization of the world and global digital governance has triggered entirely new social, political, economic, trade, educational, and cultural opportunities. The great powers effectively use digital foreign policy in tackling different policy issues. Türkiye and the Western Balkans countries could embark on common digital connectivity projects to improve multilateral relations and cooperation. Therefore, digital interdependence and cooperation could frame Türkiye’s cosmopolitan diplomacy towards the Western Balkans countries. There is a space for emphasis on a common digital agenda such as e-commerce, e-security, e-governance, and e-diplomacy, which will create a platform for countries to work together, tailor interdependent e-governance, network different national contexts, tackle organized crime and corruption, unlock and share useful data and harmonize cross-border trade and commerce.
Conclusion
In the postmodern world, characterized by risk and digital media, conventional diplomacy, and foreign policy will inevitably (re)consider emerging cosmopolitan realities. This paper attempted to use Beck’s theory of cosmopolitanism, reflexivity, and risk to analyze Turkish diplomatic relations with the Western Balkans countries. The reflexive paper analyzed dichotomies of methodological nationalism and cosmopolitanism, presenting numerous issues and risks that transcend national borders. In this regard, specific examples are provided on how Türkiye-Western Balkans relations could be grounded on involuntary enlightenment, enforced communication, political catharsis, enforced cosmopolitanism, global governance, international legalism, and digitalization. The paper also presented numerous examples of how Turkish diplomacy could be enriched with environmental diplomacy, health diplomacy, migration diplomacy, reconciliation diplomacy, digital diplomacy, youth diplomacy, and education diplomacy. In this regard, risk society and cosmopolitanism radically changed diplomacy and foreign policy. In the future, the issues of security, climate change, and the environment shall inevitably provoke international debates on mitigating various risks and threats by combining national and cosmopolitan perspectives. Climate change, environmental challenges, and security threats will provide a new arena for diplomacy and foreign policy in which postmodern concepts will be articulated, contested, and reconstructed.
Endnotes
1. Mortimer Jerome Adler, “How to Think about Progress?” in Weismann Max (ed.), How to Think about the Great Ideas: From the Great Book of Western Civilization, (Chicago: Open Court Publishing, 2002), pp. 435-445.
2. Ulrich Beck, “From Industrial Society to Risk Society: Questions of Survival, Social Structure and Ecological Enlightenment,” Theory, Culture and Society, 9, No. 1 (February 1992), pp. 97-123.
3. Gabe Mythen, “The Metamorphosis of the World: Society in Pupation?” Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 35, No. 7 (2018), pp. 189-204; Ulrich Beck, “Emancipatory Catastrophism: What Does It Mean to Climate Change and Risk Society?” Current Sociology, Vol. 63, No. 1 (2015), p. 78.
4. Lucas Bergkamp, “The Concept of Risk Society as a Model for Risk Regulation: Its Hidden and not so Hidden Ambitions, Side Effects and Risks,” Journal of Risk Research, 20, No. 10 (2017), pp. 1275-1291.
5. Beck, “Emancipatory Catastrophism: What Does It Mean to Climate Change and Risk Society?” p. 76.
6. Ulrich Beck, “World Risk Society as Cosmopolitan Society: Ecological Questions in a Framework of Manufactured Uncertainties,” in Eugene A. Rosa, Andreas Diekmann, Thomas Dietz, and Carlo C. Jaeger (eds.), Human Footprints on the Global Environment: Threats to Sustainability, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2010), pp. 47-82; Ulrich Beck, “Climate for Change, or How to Create a Green Modernity,” Theory, Culture and Society, Vol. 27, No. 2-3 (2010), pp. 254-266; Beck, “Emancipatory Catastrophism: What Does It Mean to Climate Change and Risk Society?” p. 79.
7. Ulrich Beck, The Cosmopolitan Vision, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006), pp. 59-61.
8. Bergkamp, “The Concept of Risk Society as a Model for Risk Regulation.”
9. Beck, “World Risk Society as Cosmopolitan Society.”
10. Beck, “Emancipatory Catastrophism: What Does It Mean to Climate Change and Risk Society?” pp. 83-85; Ulrich Beck, “World Risk Society and the Changing Foundations of Transnational Politics,” in Edgar Grande and Louis W Pauly (eds.), Complex Sovereignty: Reconstituting Political Authority in the Twenty-First Century, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005), pp. 22-47; Ulrich Beck, “Reflexive Governance: Politics in the Global Risk Society,” in Jan-Peter Voß, Dierk Bauknecht, and René Kemp (eds.), Reflexive Governance for Sustainable Development, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006), pp. 31-56.
11. Julia Silvia Guivant, “Ulrich Beck’s Legacy,” Ambiente & Sociedade, 19, No. 1 (2016), pp. 231-233; Beck, “Emancipatory Catastrophism: What Does It Mean to Climate Change and Risk Society?” p. 79.
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